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STATEMENT OF CASE 
CI aim <-in I ' 'I'L '"," i k is i full-time copy machine 
repairman tor the - * • Company uii October m 1 n 
September 14, 1988, Mr. Shupe was arrested for solicitation. The 
solicitation occurred during his lunch hour# when he was off 
company property and not on the properties of any businesses 
which he serviced as a repairman. He eventually pled guilty to a 
third-degree misdemeanor, and was fined $100.00. 
When he received his notice to appear to enter his plea, he 
got permission to take time off work and to go to court on the 
appropriate day. When asked about why he needed to go to court, 
the claimant, fearing reprisal, did not tell his employer the 
real reason for his court appearance and instead said that he had 
to appear in court as a witness. When he got to the court, he 
was informed that the date scheduled for his plea was incorrect, 
that the court was not in session that day, and that he would 
have to reschedule his court date. 
As of September 26, 1988, Claimant had not rescheduled his 
court date. Nor had he received the usual court warning in the 
mail that failure to reschedule would result in his arrest. On 
that day, a warrant was issued for his arrest and he was arrested 
on company property when he arrived for work. 
After his release later that day, Claimant called work and 
told his employer why he was arrested. He was immediately 
discharged. Two days later, he received in the mail his initial 
warning from the court to reschedule his appearance or be subject 
to arrest. 
The Utah Department of Employment Security denied Claimant 
unemployment compensation benefits on October 28, 1988. The 
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denial was affirmed by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on 
November 29, 1988, after a hearing on November 21, 1988. The ALJ 
found relevant an incident over thirteen months earlier, in 
October 1987, when Claimant had purportedly made sexually-
oriented comments to a fourteen year-old boy on company property, 
and had been put on probation following the incident. The ALJ 
held that there was just cause for discharge because the actions 
of Claimant "shrouded the employer's ability to trust him 
(Claimant) to behave in a socially-acceptable manner.11 On 
February 7, 1989 the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
affirmed on the same grounds. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the application of statutes or regulations to 
the pertinent facts, this Court should apply an intermediate 
standard of review, which is a determination of whether the 
conclusions are reasonable and rational. Steaen v. Department of 
Employment Security, 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. of Appeals 
1988). In determining which legal standard should be applied, the 
conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and the Board of 
Review are entitled no deference. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission used the incorrect legal standard in 
determining whether appellant John Shupe's actions constituted 
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disqualifying conduct for purposes of unemployment compensation 
benefits. However, even under the standard they used, that of 
just cause discharge, their conclusion that the conduct was 
disqualifying is not a reasonable and rational conclusion based 
on the pertinent facts because the appellant's actions were 
insufficiently "connected" to his employment and insufficiently 
indicative of fault on his part. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE SHOULD HAVE APPLIED 
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-4-5(b)(2) INSTEAD OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. §35-4-5(b)(t)« UNDER THE FORMER CLAIMANT 
IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
Prior to 1983, Utah Code Ann. 35-4-5(b)(1) denied 
unemployment benefits to a claimant who was "discharged for an 
act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a 
crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employerfs rightful interest..." The Utah Supreme Court in 
Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security. 663 P.2d 
440 (Utah 1983) articulated a three-pronged test for determining 
"misconduct" and ineligibility for unemployment compensation. A 
claimant was held to be disqualified for purposes of unemployment 
compensation benefits (1) when he was discharged for an act or 
omission in connection with the employment (2) which was 
"deliberate, willful, or wanton," and was (3) "adverse to the 
employer's rightful interests." In that case the court also held 
that disqualifying actions need not be motivated by an intention 
to cause harm to the employer or an intentional disregard of his 
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interests, but could be "volitional acts by an employee who could 
not have been heedless of their consequences." Id. at 444. 
Also in 1983, after the court had heard arguments, but 
before it had issued a decision, the Utah Legislature added a 
"just cause" provision to Section 35-4-5(b)(1), thereby denying 
eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits to any person: 
For the week in which the claimant was 
discharged for just cause or for an act or 
omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the 
employerfs rightful interest, if so found by 
the commission, and thereafter until claimant 
has earned an amount equal to at least six 
times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in 
bona fide covered employment. (Emphasis 
added) 
The case of Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission. 700 P.2d 1129 (1985) was the first to address the new 
"just cause" provision. The Kehl court determined that in order 
to find just cause, there still must be a finding of fault on the 
part of the claimant. The basic factors the court relied upon to 
establish "fault" and ineligibility for benefits under the 
definition of just cause were: (a) culpability, (b) knowledge, 
and (c) control. 
In Lane v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission. 727 
P.2d 206 (Utah 1986) the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
standards for "just cause" and "deliberate, willful or wanton 
misconduct" were identical since the court in Clearfield had 
already determined that the latter did not require intentional 
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harm to the employer's interests. Id. at 210. They interpreted 
the addition of "just cause" as designed to do exactly what the 
decision in Clearfield did: eliminate the requirement of 
intentional harm. See also Utah Administrative Code 
§R475-5fe-l II. 3. Since some fault on the part of the claimant 
was still required, the Industrial Commission had promulgated 
rules pertaining to culpability, knowledge, and control. 
The plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1) requires 
that for acts constituting crimes, it is not the proper to apply 
this particular section to determine disqualifying conduct. The 
statute explicitly limits its application to "an act or 
omission...not constituting a crime." Utah Code Ann. §35-4-
5(b)(2) deals with discharges for criminal acts. It might be 
argued that "just cause" is a separate standard and that the 
limitation to non-criminal acts applies only to deliberate, 
wanton or willful misconduct. Not only does Lane rule out this 
interpretation, the courtfs decision there implied that the 
legislature was not attempting to modify the portion of 35-4-
5(b)(1) limiting that section to crimes. Even the dissent in 
Lane, which claimed that there were two separate standards, was 
based on the reasoning that while "deliberate, wanton or willful 
misconduct" describes "conduct which falls short of being 
intentional but which is more culpable than negligence...* just 
cause1 for termination...might arise from the commission of a 
negligent act." Id. at 212. Finally, Utah Administrative Code 
§R475-5b-2 V. 1. and 2. state that discharge for crime should be 
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determined under 5(b)(1) only where it is disputed whether a 
crime was committed. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(2) requires not only a connection 
to work# but that the crime be one of dishonesty. It will be 
argued later that the actions of the claimant were not 
sufficiently connected to work to constitute disqualifying 
conduct, but it is clear that the claimant's crime was not one of 
dishonesty. John Shupe pled guilty to a third-degree misdemeanor 
for solicitation, and paid a $100.00 fine. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
1302 defines solicitation as agreeing to engage in sex for a fee 
or loitering in front of a public building for that purpose. The 
Utah Unemployment Insurance Rules state that "dishonesty in this 
context generally means theft but may also include other criminal 
acts connected with the work that render an employee 
untrustworthy or show a lack of integrity." Utah Administrative 
Code §R475-5b-2 III. There is nothing in whatever act 
constituted the claimant's act of solicitation that indicates any 
lack of trustworthiness or lack of integrity. Since the 
Industrial Commission applied the wrong legal standard, and under 
the correct standard the claimant is entitled to benefits, the 
decision of the Industrial Commission should be reversed. 
POINT II. THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT WAS INSUFFICIENTLY 
CONNECTED TO EMPLOYMENT TO WARRANT DENIAL OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
The Utah Unemployment Insurance Rules state that 
disqualifying conduct must "have such xconnection' to the 
employee's duties and to the employer's business that it is a 
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subject of legitimate and significant concern to the employer.tf 
Utah Administrative Code, §475-5b-l VIII. (emphasis added). Thus, 
in order for there to be a sufficient connection between the 
actions of the claimant and his employment (1) the concerns of 
the employer must be legitimate, (2) there must be a significant 
potential hinderance if the employee's ability to perform his 
duties, and (3) there must be significant potential harm to the 
employer's interests. 
John Shupe was a copy-machine repairman. He was convicted 
of a misdemeanor and lied to his employer about why he had to go 
to court. Due mainly to bureaucratic error he was arrested on 
company property for not appearing in court to enter his plea. 
What John Shupe was punished for in a court of law and by 
his employers through losing his job should not be the basis for 
denial of unemployment benefits unless his conduct was 
sufficiently connected to his employment. The incident involving 
the 14 year-old boy took place on company property and during 
work hours. It was sufficiently connected to his employment to 
be disqualifying conduct if other requirements were met. And the 
employer did take corrective action and set forth guidelines for 
the claimant to follow which he successfully completed. His 
ninety-day probation ended nine months prior to discharge. 
Most of the conduct of the claimant that is relevant to this 
case took place away from the workplace and not during work 
hours. And while the claimant might have lied about why he had to 
appear in court because of embarrassment or fear of reprisal by 
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his employer, the magnitude of his lie (as compared with what 
potentially he had to lose by telling the truth) is minimal, and 
not necessarily reflective of his general trustworthiness as an 
employee. The claimant's reason for missing work was that he had 
to appear in court, and he informed his employer about this fact 
truthfully. Mr. Shupefs white lie about being a witness, rather 
than the defendant, was hardly advisable but does not warrant the 
generality that he is "untrustworthy" and therefore incapable of 
successfully completing his professional duties. But the 
supervisor who discharged the claimant, James Olson, testified 
that he fired him because of the lie about the court appearance, 
that the claimant could no longer be trusted with the tools the 
company left in his care (TR. 7). 
This case is distinguishable from Clearfield City v. Dept. 
of Employment Security. 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). The claimant's 
actions in that case were much more egregious; he committed an 
act of sodomy with one of his students at his secondary job at 
the Clearfield Job Corps Center, while being observed by other 
students. Id. at 441. It was widely publicized. And the claimant 
there was also a police officer. The incident significantly 
affected the his ability to perform his duties. As the court in 
Clearfield noted, since "the entire course of events was a matter 
of public notoriety in the city...(there) would surely have 
(been) a significant adverse effect upon the officer's 
credibility as a police officer and as a witness in the courts of 
law." Id. at 443. In the case at bar not only was there no 
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publicity which might have affected the claimants ability to 
perform his duties, his duties were not of the sort which would 
likely be damaged by such publicity. As in Clearfield, the 
claimant also told a lie to his supervisor, but the extent of the 
lie was merely why he had to appear in court. Given the 
embarrassing nature of the situation, and its irrelevance to his 
work, this lie is hardly the sort of event that would be expected 
to be repeated. 
The court in Clearfield also noted that the claimant there 
was breaking a law that he had an affirmative public duty to 
uphold. Mr. Shupe's profession added no such additional duties to 
be of extremely high moral character. The Administrative Law 
Judge held that employers are warranted in expecting that 
employees behave away from work "in a socially acceptable manner" 
(ALJ's decision, p. 2). This is too broad; it makes almost any 
conduct connected to employment. The employer does have an 
interest in preventing dishonor to the company's name and 
preserving the company's reputation is a legitimate concern. In 
the case at bar the claimant was not on company property, not at 
any business serviced by the company, not arrested while working, 
not arrested for a significant crime, and received no publicity, 
nor was he likely to receive publicity for the arrest. The 
proposition that there was significant potential harm to the 
employer's interests or that the claimant's ability to perform 
his job was affected in any way are not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
10 
The ALJ also suggested that the claimant broke a reasonable 
rule of the employer, wthat any similar behavior (to the incident 
in October 1987) would result in dismissal" (ALJ's decision, page 
2). But the first incident occurred on company property and 
during work hours. The employer presented little evidence 
regarding either incident, but there are obvious dissimilarities. 
The only similarity is that the both involved sex, and this 
connection itself depends on Scott Olson's hearsay within hearsay 
testimony regarding the first incident (TR. 9). There is not even 
the suggestion that the second event was "socially unacceptable" 
in a similar way. There was no suggestion that the behavior 
involved homosexual conduct or a minor. Its unacceptability 
consisted mostly in its illegality, which may just have been a 
matter of loitering in the wrong place at the wrong time. See 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1302 (1973). The employer's warning to the 
claimant in October 1987 was too ambiguous to constitute a rule 
and a reasonable interpretation of it would hardly apply to the 
actions for which the claimant was arrested for in connection to 
the solicitation charge. It is not a legitimate concern of the 
employer that employees behave in a "socially acceptable" manner 
when off company property and during non-working hours. The Utah 
Administrative Code reflect this; they require at least potential 
significant damage to the reputation of the business. Id. at 
§R475-5b-l VII. Since this is not a legitimate concern, and what 
concerns the employer had were insignificantly related to either 
the claimant's ability to perform his duties or other potential 
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harm to the employer's interests, the decision of the Industrial 
Commission that the claimant's conduct was sufficiently connected 
to his employment to warrant denial of benefits should be 
reversed. 
POINT III. THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT DID NOT CONSTITUTE JUST 
CAUSE FOR DISCHARGE SINCE IT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
CULPABLE NOR COULD HE HAVE REASONABLY 
ANTICIPATED THE EFFECT IT WOULD HAVE. 
The Utah Unemployment Insurance Rules list three 
requirements for a determination of eligibility under its 
definition of just causes (a) culpability (b) knowledge, and (c) 
control. Since the question of control is not at issue in the 
Shupe case, only the culpability and knowledge factors will be 
analyzed in this memorandum. These are the three factors that the 
court in Kehl v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, supra, 
stated were the proper elements to consider in determining fault 
on the part of the claimant. 
A. THE CLAIMANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY CULPABLE. 
The Kehl court defined culpability as the seriousness of the 
conduct as it affects continuance of the employment relationship. 
The discharge "must have been necessary to avoid actual or 
potential harm to the employer•s rightful interests... The 
wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it affects the employer's rights. 
If the conduct was an isolated incident of poor judgment and 
there is no expectation that the conduct will be continued or 
repeated, potential harm may not be shown and therefore it is not 
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necessary to discharge the employee." Utah Administrative Code 
§R475-5b-l II. 1. a. 
The court in Kehl held that the wrongness of claimant's 
conduct (carrying ten thousand ponds of explosives over a train 
track while a train was approaching), if viewed in the context of 
the employment and the potentially devastating effects on the 
employer's rights, was severe. Discharge in Kehl was necessary 
to avoid the potential harm to the employer's interests that 
another violation would cause. 
Applying the "culpability" standard to the Shupe case, it 
should be reasonably concluded that Shupe's conduct doesn't reach 
the standard of culpability set forth in Kehl. Shupe's conduct 
was not a work-related or during-work act. Whereas Kehl's act of 
carrying explosives over the train tracks in the wake of an 
approaching train shows a reckless disregard for the company 
rules and an imminent danger to human lives, the claimant's 
conduct only concerned himself. Kehl's act could have cost her 
employer, Hercules, several hundreds of thousands of dollars, as 
well as cost Hercules its excellent reputation in the community. 
Shupe's conduct cost his employer nothing. His conduct does not 
show a disregard for the company rules, nor does his conduct 
relate to his work at all. Company rules cannot reasonably 
regulate an employee's life during non-work hours, unless the 
regulation is regarding conduct which would prevent the employee 
from performing his/her job satisfactorily or could cause 
significant damage for the employee. Whether Shupe solicited sex 
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or not during his non-work hours has no bearing on whether he can 
perform his duties as a copy repairman to the satisfaction of his 
employer. And it is hard to see how his actions could subject the 
employer to any sort of legal liability. 
Finally, there is no evidence that Shupe's conduct caused 
any negative publicity for the employer — in fact, there is no 
evidence that the incident was publicized at all. Shupe's 
conduct can be distinguished from the conduct in the Kehl case, 
where a potential accident would definitely have received adverse 
publicity for Hercules, and might have caused a public outcry 
against the company for its lack of compliance with public safety 
concerns. 
Shupefs conduct can also be distinguished from the conduct 
in Clearfield City v. Department of Employment Security, 663 P.2d 
440 (Utah 1983), where a policeman who also worked part time as a 
counselor committed sodomy on the job site where he was a 
counselor. In the Clearfield case, the sodomy incident was 
widely publicized in the community. Said the Clearfield Court, 
11
 In the sensitive area of law enforcement a police officer's 
reputation of high moral character and his credibility as a 
witness in his frequent appearances in the court of law are 
essential to his effective performance of his duty...Under the 
circumstances, the claimantfs actions were sufficiently culpable 
and adverse to the employer's rightful interest to invoke 
disqualification under Section 35-4-5(b)(1) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act." See Clearfield, 663 P.2d at 442. 
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Unlike the law enforcement area, Shupe's job as a copy-
machine repairman did not require high moral character. Nor did 
Shupe's immoral conduct threaten to bring his company into 
disrepute. Without substantiated evidence of adverse publicity 
to the Les Olson Company proximately caused by Shupe's arrest, 
Shupe's conduct cannot be considered "culpable11 and adverse to 
his employerfs interests under 35-4-5(b)(1). 
B. IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO EXPECT THE CLAIMANT TO ANTICIPATE 
THE EFFECTS OF HIS CONDUCT. 
In Lane v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission, 727 
P.2d 206 (Utah 1986), a truck stop employee was discharged from 
his employment when he was cited by policemen for selling beer to 
a minor. His employer company refused to pay him unemployment 
benefits. The court, in determining whether the employee had 
been discharged with just cause, looked at whether the employee 
Mhad knowledge" of the company policy not to sell beer to minors. 
The court held that while the employee did have knowledge of 
the prohibition of liquor sales to minors, nonetheless his error 
in not checking the customer's identification was merely a 
mistake in judgment and not an intentional or knowing disregard 
of his employer's policy. Said the court, "there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that Telum (the employer) established any 
clear procedures for employees to follow to assure that beer 
would not be sold to minors, other than to instruct them to check 
identification when in doubt." Lane, 727 P.2d at 211. 
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Likewise, in the Kehl case, the Court held that in order for 
an employee to have sufficient knowledge of the conduct expected 
of him by his employer, the employer must have given either a 
clear explanation of the expected behavior or have a pertinent 
written policy regarding that conduct. "If the employerfs 
expectations are unclear, ambiguous, or inconsistent, the 
existence of knowledge is not shown." Kehl. 700 P.2d at 1133. 
In the case at bar, there was no clear written policy on 
employer's expectations of employees1 behavior while not at work. 
Although Shupe was warned by his employer in 1987 that sexual 
solicitation of a minor on the job would not be acceptable to the 
company, there was no explanation given that any kind of 
solicitation whatsoever, whether on company property or not, 
whether during work hours or not, or whether to a minor or not, 
would be reprehensible to the company. With no company 
regulations and no verbal explanations of his expected conduct 
off-duty and during non-work hours, Shupe could not be expected 
to know that his non-work-related conduct was violative of 
company policy. He can only be held to have knowledge of what 
his employer's expectations of his conduct on the job were. 
The Lane court held that the truck stop employee's omission 
of a check on a minor's identification was an isolated instance 
of poor judgment. Likewise, Shupe's off-site sexual solicitation 
is an isolated instance of poor judgment in a situation where he 
had no knowledge of company policy, indeed, a situation where 
company policy did not exist. Therefore, Shupe should not be 
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held to have the requisite knowledge which constitutes just 
cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(b)(1), Claimant John Shupe was 
not discharged with just cause. His actions were not 
sufficiently connected with his employment to constitute just 
cause for discharge. His discharge was not necessary to avoid 
actual or potential harm to his employer's rightful interests, 
nor did he have the sufficient culpability or knowledge to 
constitute "fault,11 a necessary requisite to establishing just 
cause. The Industrial Commission should have applied Utah Code 
Ann. §35-4-5(b)(2), but the claimant's conduct did not constitute 
disqualifying conduct under this statute either. For these 
reasons we respectfully request that this court reverse the 
decisions of the Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission, and order the Industrial Commission 
to award unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant, John 
Shupe• 
DATED this f^f day of Q ^ N 5 £ , 1989. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Claimant 
By: WARD 
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35-4-5. Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for pur-
poses of establishing a waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left 
work voluntarily without good cause, if so found 
by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in 
bona fide covered employment and earned wages 
for those services equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant 
shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the 
claimant leaves work under circumstances of 
such a nature that it would be contrary to equity 
and good conscience to impose a disqualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the 
employer, consider for the purposes of this chap-
ter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a 
genuine continuing attachment to the labor mar-
ket in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity 
and good conscience. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
section, a claimant who has left work voluntarily 
to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to 
or in a new locality does so without good cause 
for purposes of this subsection. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant 
was discharged for just cause or for an act or 
omission in connection with employment, 
not constituting a crime, which is deliberate, 
willful, or wanton and adverse to the em-
ployer's rightful interest, if so found by the 
commission, and thereafter until the claim-
ant has earned an amount equal to at least 
six times the claimant's weekly benefit 
amount in bona fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was dis-
charged for dishonesty constituting a crime 
in connection with his work as shown -by the 
facts together with his admission, or as 
shown by his conviction in a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction of a crime in connection 
with that dishonesty and for the 51 next fol-
lowing weeks. If by reason of his alleged dis-
honesty in connection with his work, the in-
dividual is held in legal custody or is free on 
bail, any determination of his eligibility 
shall be held in abeyance pending his release 
or conviction^ 
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5-5b. Discharge and Discharge for 
ae 
5b-1 Discharge 
5b-2 Discharge for Crime 
•5b-1. Discharge 
icnerai Definition 
linanlv accepted concepts of justice are used in 
nining if a discharge is disqualifying under the 
cause* provisions of the Act Just cause is 
d as a job separation that is necessary due to 
enousness of actual or potential harm to the 
>ver provided the claimant had knowledge of 
nplover s expectations and had control over the 
nstances which led to the discharge Just cause 
t estabhshed if the reason for the discharge is 
ss, arbitrary or capricious or the employer has 
to uniformly apply reasonable standards to all 
vees when instituting disciplinary action The 
se of this section is to deny benefits to mdivi-
who bnng about their own unemployment by 
cting themselves, with respect to their emplo-
with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of 
leration to such a degree that the employer was 
ed in discharging the employee However, when 
uployee is discharged by his employer, such 
irge may have been the result of incompetence, 
Df skill, or other reasons which are beyond the 
mt's control The question which must be est-
ed by the evidence is whether the claimant is at 
in his resulting unemployment Unemployment 
nee benefits will be denied if the employer had 
:ause for discharging the employee However, 
very cause for discharge provides a basis to 
benefits In order to have just cause for disch-
pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there must 
ne fault on the pan of the employee involved 
fust Cause 
rhe basic factors which establish just cause, and 
»entia! for a determination of ineligibility arc 
"ulpabihty 
s is the seriousness of the conduct or the seve-
>f the offense as it affects continuance of the 
jyment relationship. The discharge must have 
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to 
mployer's rightful interests A discharge would 
)e considered "necessary" if it is not consistent 
reasonable employment practices. The wi-ong* 
of the conduct must be considered in the context 
le particular employment and how it affects the 
oyer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated 
ent of poor judgment and there is no expecta-
that the conduct will be continued or repeated, 
mal harm may not be shown and therefore it i$ 
ecessary to discharge the employee 
Longevity and prior work record are important 
etermimng if the act or omission is an isolated 
ent or a good faith error m judgment. An 
oyee who has historically complied with work 
does not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
gh harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
therefore require discharge to avoid future harm 
le employer For example. A long term employee 
does not have a history of tardiness or absent-
n is absent without leave for a number of days 
to a death in his immediate family. Although 
is a violation of the employer's rules and may 
bhsh just cause for discharging a new employee, 
fact that the employee has established over a long 
od of time that he complies with attendance rules 
vs that the circumstance is more of an isolated 
jent rather than a violation of the rules that is or 
Id be expected to be habitual In this case because 
potential for harm to the employer is not shown, 
> not necessary for the employer to discharge the 
)loyee, and therefore just cause is not established 
j b Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the 
conduct which the employer expected. It is not nee 
essary that the claimant intended to cause harm to 
the employer, but he should reasonably have been 
able to anticipate the effect his conduct *ould have 
Knowledge may not be estabhshed unless the empi-
J oyer gave a clear explanation of the expected bcha-
I vior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the 
I case of a flagrant violation of a universal standard of 
| behavior If the employer's expectations are unclear, 
] ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowl-
edge is not shown A specific warning is one way of 
showing that the employee had knowledge of the 
expected conduct After the employee is given i 
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct 
objectionable conduct. Additional violations occur-
ring after the warning would be necessary to establish 
just cause for a discharge 
(1) For Example When the employer has an esta-
blished procedure of progressive discipline, such 
procedures generally must have been followed m 
order to establish that the employee had knowledge 
of the expected behavior or the seriousness of the 
act. The exception is that very severe conduct, such 
as criminal actions, may justify immediate discharge 
without following a progressive disciplinary program 
3. The term "just cause" as used in Section 5(b)(1) 
does not lessen the requirement that there be some 
fault on the part of the employee involved. Prior to 
the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Com-
mission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an int-
entional infliction of harm or intentional disregard of 
the employer's interests. The intent of the Legisla-
ture in adding the words "just cause" to Section 
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive int-
erpretation. While some fault must be present, it is 
sufficient that the acts were intended, the conseque-
nces were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts 
have serious effect on the employee's job or the 
employer's interests. 
VII In Connection with Employment 
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses 
which take place on the employer's premises or 
during business hours. It is only necessary that the 
conduct have such "connection* to the employee's 
duties and to the employer's business that it is a 
subject of legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer. All employers, both public and private 
have the right to expect employees to refrain from 
acts which are detrimental to the business or would 
bnng dishonor on the business name or the institu-
tion. Legitimate interests of employers mclude, but 
are not limited to* goodwill of customers, reputation 
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty. 
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Cnme 
I General Definition 
1 A cnme is a punishable act in violation of law, 
an offense against the State or the United States 
"Cnme" and "Misdemeanor" are synonymous terms; 
though in common usage cnme is used to denote 
offenses of a more senous nature. However, for 
example- an insignificant, although illegal act, or the 
taking of something which is of little or no value, or 
believed to have been abandoned may not be suffc-
icnt to establish that a cnme was committed as 
defined for the application of this section of the Act, 
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation 
of the law 
ADDENDUM 2 - 1 
2. The duty of honesty is implied in any empio^ 
mem relationship A worker is obligated to deal wit 
his employer in truthfulness and good faith A 
individual discharged for dishonesty constituting 
cnme connected with his work is at fault in his rec 
ulting unemployment The 52 week disquaiificatio 
for "dishonesty constituting a cnme* required by tt 
statute is a mandatory penalty 
3 The basic factors which are essential for a dis 
qualification under this provision of the law are tha 
the individual was discharged for a crime that was 
a. In connection with work 
b Dishonesty 
c. Admitted or established by a conviction m 
coun of law 
III Dishonesty 
Dishonesty tn this context generally means tht 
but may also include other criminal acts connect 
wtth the work that render the employee untrust* 
nhy or show a lack of integrity Dishonesty n 
involving a crime may still be disqualifying unc 
provisions of Section 5(b)(1) 
IV Admission or Conviction in a Court 
1 An admission is a voluntary acknowledges 
made by a claimant that he has committed acts which 
are in violation of the law In this context, the 
admission may be a verbal or wntten statement by 
the claimant that he committed the act The admis-
sion does not necessarily have to be made to a Dep-
artment representative However, there must be suf-
ficient information to establish that it was noc a false 
statement given under duress or made to obtain some 
concession. 
2. A conviction is when a claimant has been found 
guilty by a court of committing acts which are in 
violation of the law When the claimant pleads "no 
contest" or agrees to the diversionary program as 
provided by the court, this is treated, for the purp-
oses of this section of the Act, the same as a convi-
ction and benefits will be denied. 
V Benefits Held in Abeyance 
1 If the claimant has not made an admission, but 
is held in legal custody or free on bail, the law req-
uires a withholding of a determination of eligibility 
Benefits cannot be paid unless a determination of 
eligibility is made Failure to pay benefits even 
though the burden of proof for a denial under 
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because 
the court, in holding the claimant in legal custody or 
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that 
the state has established that a cnme has been con-
mitted and there is reason to believe the individual 
committed that cnme. The filing of charges is not the 
same as being held in custody 
2. However, if there is a preponderance of evid 
ence that the act was committed, a denial of benefits 
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if 
charges have not been filed by the employer within 
four weeks In such a case, the decision under 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a 
decision under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) is still pending 
and the 5(b)(1) disqualification shall be changed to a 
5(b)(2) disqualification if the claimant is found guilty 
by the court If the claimant has purged a 5(b)(1) 
disqualification which was or could be assessed 
pending a ruling by the coun, benefits must be held 
in abeyance until the court reaches the verdia The 
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Depa-
rtment with the court's verdia in order to establish 
eligibility 
76-10-1302. Prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when: 
(a) He engages or offers or agrees to engage in 
any sexual activity with another person for a fee; 
or 
(b) Is an inmate of a house of prostitution; or 
(c) Loiters in or within view of any public 
place for the purpose of being hired to engage in 
sexual activity. 
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor, provided 
that any person who is twice convicted under this 
section shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1973 
ADDENDUM 3 - 1 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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